It shows the toxic nature of the premeditated use of these as weapons with the knowledge of the harm to those exposed. Some were by known testing, the rest not. The government has been involved in illicit coverups to deny benefits specifically described by law to veterans and to their families. Further, since the families, who may have had minors impacted, were not represented then the children’s civil rights have been violated as they should have been notified they needed their own legal advisor either authorized or appointed by the state. Spouses and families can be represented by a class action including attorney generals for each state as well as by children with their guardian ad litem’s represented by the attorney generals of each state. This paper deals with just a few pertinent facts. There are many, many more to support the statements contained herein.

The government has made numerous substantive errors in their denial of claims going back to 1978. Veteran had active chloracne, his hand was stained red, and was permanently disabled at ETS even though the Active Army distorted the seriousness of the injury at the end and just after the Vietnam War. The veteran was victimized by illegal government SOP as were hundreds of thousand of other veterans. The veteran sustained career ending injuries as an 11B2P and was poisoned by dioxins used at Ft Bragg for maintenance as well as in C-123’s used routinely by the 82nd Airborne Division that were full of Agent Orange, et al, pushed into every crevice because of the devices used to pump it out at high pressure of the same C-123’s over Vietnam. One was tested almost 20 years later by Dr Stellman from Columbia University who found the reading to be 86 times the maximum exposure rate after flying 20 years with no doors and the tailgate open. She and her group of researchers debunked the main government witness, Dr Alvin Young, to not being the expert in the areas he testified in that make all the denials of causation and exposure by the government moot. The VA itself has published that the average life expectancy for a WW2 veteran is 82 years while a Vietnam veteran is 65. That is self explanatory. The veteran was also exposed to biological warfare experiments in the Spring of 1974 specifically by an unmarked C-130 with aerial dispersal equipment attached flying at roughly 1,000 feet actively spraying his unit and others in the field resulting in mass reporting of maladies never explained even with the inclusion of outside specialists looking at us. This too is in the medical records. This was also confirmed by the former commandant of the Ft Campbell Hospital, a now retired Brigadier General, who dealt with the same issues experienced by the 5th Special Forces Group and the 160th SOAR when they moved from Bragg. His observation was that it was pretty bad and no one knew what caused it. In 2018 the Secretary stated that the VA only had the responsibility to attend to “tactical herbicides” by law. That is factually incorrect. The law makes no reference to particular classes of herbicides. It simply refers to herbicides which are also contained in one class logistically. Furthermore, in FM 3-3, Tactical Employment of Herbicides, December 1971, The Forward makes no distinction as it states:

“This manual provides information for use in planning herbicide operations at division, brigade, and lower levels. It contains a discussion of advantages that can be obtained by employing herbicides in tactical situations. The physical and chemical properties of agents ORANGE, BLUE, and WHITE are presented with information on agent handling and disposal methods. The manual also discusses air and ground dissemination systems, conditions influencing the effectiveness of herbicides, and guidance for command and control of herbicide operations. Information is presented on the downwind drift hazards produced by the A/A45Y-1, PAU-7/B, and AGRINAUTICS spray systems. A conversion chart and a glossary of terms are included at the end of the publication.” There is only mention of the tactical use of Herbicides on Page 1-1. On Page 2-1 (2) “The components of ORANGE are rapidly decomposed by soil microorganisms and the chemical usually disappears from soils within 1 to 3 months following application. Lateral distribution of-the agent due to volatility alone is negligible.(3) ORANGE is low in toxicity to man, fish, and wildlife; but it will cause slight skin irritation and minor inhalation effects.” That has been determined to be incorrect.

Item IV, below, the Reigle Report, was an investigation by Senator Reigle into aspects of the Iraq War. The Northport VAMC sent me through a series of tests by Dr Cheney, the Neuropsychologist, over several years. He noted that I had 90% of the symptoms of Gulf War Illness. The combination of the unmarked C-130 spraying us with unknown substances causing serious medical issues confirmed by various sources made it apparent there was a distinct connection. My neurologist, Dr Kaufman, wrote to his sources about my exposure and was told it was not 50 years yet and that information would not be released. He stated the good news is that whatever it was I was sprayed with was real, and the bad news is that it was real. Of course, there are significant gaps in when and what items were sent. The timeline fits - testing in the 70’s to deployment in Iraq for use against the Iranians around Basra, and then occupation of Iraq by the Allies shortly thereafter. If it smells like a duck, sounds like a duck, and waddles like a duck - duck.

The culmination of all of the above is that this veteran is rated at ***% disabled including ***% neurological without attributing Parkinsons and diabetes as service connected. Veteran has been referred for neurological research program in Charleston outside of the VAMC.

Congress enacted the PACT Act that opened up recognition of more areas with contamination but notably left quite a few bases off of the lists previously prepared and demonstrated to be contaminated with dioxins. The Courts have recognized these many bases as having been contaminated and have awarded compensation to the afflicted veterans rendering the DOD recommendation salacious in its effort to deny any responsibility. Senator Tester made mention receiving the Elizabeth Dole Foundation Award that he was pushing new law to be enacted precisely because the old law was not being observed by the DOD and the VA. That law was passed by the Senate and the House in 2024. There is a case wherein two veterans are being heard by the Supreme Court in 2024 that they are not being given the benefit of the doubt as is detailed in existing law. The proof is clear, convincing and overwhelming at every level with respect to toxic contamination on military bases. Ft Bragg has now spawned litigation because of PFAS. The DOJ itself is under fire for failure to conduct itself within the confines of judicial provenance and conduct. The case can be made that any government lawyer knowing, or should know, the concurrent related events and law as well as a more complete awareness of applicable government programs, regulations and laws promulgated for use by other Agencies such as EPA - would be violating their professional ethics in their capacity as lawyers for the government by denying the benefits prescribed by law for the veteran.

The DOD has created numerous programs now to be in compliance with environmental law being passed. (See 1994 U. S. ARMY HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT MANUAL “The Vision - The U.S. Army will be the national leader in eliminating health hazards from, and integrating human performance criteria into the life-cycle management of materiel systems). Specific objectives of the HHAP are to:

• Preserve and protect the health of the individual soldier.
• Reduce degradation of the soldier's performance and of the system's
• effectiveness.
• Enhance the original system design so that retrofits needed to eliminate or
• control health hazards are reduced.
• Reduce readiness deficiencies that are attributable to health hazards, which
• cause training or operational restrictions.
• Reduce personnel compensation claims byeliminating or reducing injury or illness caused by health hazards associated with the use of Army systems.
• Reduce health hazards that may impact on soldier survivability.
• Reduce health hazards due to potential environmental contamination associated
• with the use of Army systems.”

Specific mention is made as to the critical need for environmental sustainability which includes the need to cut down on veteran claims after separation from the service. This is not new - it is 30 years old.

1. Veteran experienced biological tests in the Spring of 1974 at Ft Bragg, NC, and potentially chemical war tests and spent about a month at the White Sands Missile Range in September 1974 as advance party and with unit assignment for training there. This range is actively used and is not far from where the original atomic war testing was conducted. The Army originally erroneously denied any responsibility to notify those tested and to medically attend to them.

Affirmation from the case below:

The government has conducted chemical and biological weapons tests on human subjects where tens of thousands of member of the United States armed services were intentionally exposed to a variety of chemical and biological agents.

2. The Army later conceded a “serious” editing error, Appendix F of the reissued regulation provided that “research involving deliberate exposure of human subjects to nuclear weapons effect, to chemical warfare agents, or to biological warfare agents” was “exempt from this regulation”. AR 70-25 was revised and reissued two years later.

I. VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA; Swords to Plowshares, Veterans Rights Organization; et al, v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; John Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; United States Department of Defense; Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense; United States

Department of the Army; John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army; United States of America; United States Department of Veteran Affairs; Robert A. McDonald, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Defendants–Appellees–Cross–Appellants.

Nos. 13–17430, 14–15108.

Decided: June 30, 2015

OPINION:

From the inception of the United States' chemical weapons program during World War I until the mid–1970s, the United States military conducted chemical and biological weapons experiments on human subjects. In these experiments, tens of thousands of members of the United States armed services were intentionally exposed to a range of chemical and biological agents.

Plaintiffs are veterans' organizations and individuals who were subjects in these experiments. They filed an individual and class action complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department of Defense (“DOD”), the Army, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). The class comprises “all current or former members of the armed forces, who, while serving in the armed forces, were test subjects” in these experimentation programs. Two of Plaintiffs' claims, brought under §706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), are at issue in this appeal. Plaintiffs claim, first, that the Army has unlawfully failed to notify test subjects of new medical and scientific information relating to their health as it becomes available. They claim, second, that the Army has unlawfully withheld medical care for diseases or conditions proximately caused by their exposures during the experiments. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that Army Regulation 70–25 (“AR 70–25”) imposes on the Army an ongoing duty to notify former test subjects of relevant new health information as it becomes available. The court issued an injunction requiring the Army to comply with that duty. The court held, further, that AR 70–25 imposes on the Army an ongoing duty to provide medical care, but the court declined to compel the Army to provide such care on the ground that Plaintiffs could seek medical care from the VA. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We agree with the district court that the Army has an ongoing duty under AR 70–25 to provide former test subjects with newly available information relating to their health, and that this duty is judicially enforceable under § 706(1). We also agree with the district court that the Army has an ongoing duty to provide medical care. However, the district court denied relief on the ground that the VA provides medical care that to some degree duplicates the care the Army is obligated to provide. We disagree with the district court that relief should have been denied on this ground.

Background (Abstracts):

In 1975, the Army ceased performing large scale experiments exposing human subjects to chemical agents. In the late 1970s, against a backdrop of mounting public concern about the long-term effects of such experiments, Army officials exchanged a series of memoranda outlining a program for notifying past subjects about the health consequences of their participation in the experiments. On August 8, 1979, Army General Counsel Jill Wine–Volner wrote a memorandum to a number of high-level Army officials and to the Army Surgeon General. She wrote that the Secretary of the Army has concluded that, as a policy matter, some type of notification program is necessary. Moreover, the legal necessity for a notification program is not open to dispute. The Department of Justice has concluded that another Federal agency ‘may well be held to have a legal duty to notify those drug-testing subjects whose health [it] has reason to believe may still be adversely affected by their prior involvement in [the] drug-testing program.’

Finally, in what the Army later conceded was a “serious” editing error, Appendix F of the reissued regulation provided that “research involving deliberate exposure of human subjects to nuclear weapons effect, to chemical warfare agents, or to biological warfare agents” was “exempt from this regulation.” The Army revised and reissued AR 70–25 two years later. This 1990 revision remains in force today. This revision was, in all relevant respects but one, the same as the 1988 revision. There was, however, one important change—the correction of the erroneous exemption from coverage of human subjects who had been deliberately exposed to “nuclear weapon effect” and to chemical and biological agents.

2. This list of pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, rodenticides and Algaecide is taken from the following report and is self explanatory. The use of Roundup and paraquat have both been found to be toxic. A prominent medical researcher, Dr David Carpenter, founder of the SUNY Albany Environmental School, former NYS Public Health Officer, commissioned in the National Health Service, has testified as an expert witness in about 400 cases against Monsanto and its’ use of Roundup as a cause for cancer and other maladies. Roundup is the commercial name for the dioxins and/or derivatives used by the military as a matter of course on their installations. Contrary to the assertion of the Secretary in his rebuttal of a 2018 GAO report on Agent Orange, the law cited by him does NOT distinguish between “tactical herbicides” and ones used for maintenance. Logistically those chemicals use the same grouping and handling per respective reports. Therefor the assertions denying exposure by the government are invalid on their face and any dioxin exposures from these sources are the basis for claims. Pope AFB and Fort Bragg are now a joint service base.

II. Abstract from AD-A227 043:

INSTALLATION RESTORATION PROGRAM

PHASE I -RECORDS SEARCH

POPE AFB, NORTH CAROLINA

May 1985 - TABLE D.3, Pg D-8

PESTICIDES CURRENTLY USED AT POPE AFB:

Insectides Rodenticides HerbicidesFungicides

Dursban MAKI Spike 5G Benlate

FICAM W Warfarin Roundup* Acti Dione Thiram

Diazinon Calcium Cyanide A-Dust Pramitol 25E

Mayforce Rodeo

PZ 270 Dursban

Prograss

PZ 250 Baygon Weed Hoe 108

Unicorn Fogging Solution KERB

Baygon Paraquat*

Ants Chipco Ronstar G Daconil 2787

Pharorid Sencor

Chlordone Algaecide

Pyrethrum

Waspand Hornet Killer Cutrine-Plus

Sevin

Deltic

Precor 5E

Malathion

Chlorpyifos

Nemacur

***Specific note is made of Roundup and Paraquat.

III. Items of note in this paragraph include the level research done herein with respect to chemical warfare banned in 1974 through the 1980’s and the research with pesticides and toxins in groundwater. Detailed notes on the actual work is contained in Volume II. The other is that the name of the laboratory was changed as it has throughout its’ history, making finding records difficult. In the Reigle Report a witness stated the failure to maintain various records was deliberate.

UNITED STATES ARMY BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY Report MEDDH-288 (R1). FORT DETRICK, FREDERICK, MD 21701

ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 1 October 1986 - 30 September 1987 - VOLUME I

This report has detailed information about the many kinds of research conducted during that time frame including collaborations with Allies. “DD Form 1473 9. ABSTRACT- The Annual Progress Report, Fiscal Year 1987, summarizes in two volumes the research performed by the U.S. Army Biomedical Research and Development Laboratory in projects authorized by The Surgeon General the Army, and the Commander, U.S.Army Medical Research and Development Command, and supported by funds from the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command. Field Sanitation and Water, Conventional Weapon Systems. Smokes/Obscurants, Synthetic or Alternative Fuels, Environmental Quality, Installation Restoration, Pest Management, …, Management of Casualties, …Block 18, Continued - Munition and Other Wastewater Treatment, Chemical Hardening of Medical

Equipment, Medical Staff Dosimeter, Resuscitation Devices, Chemical Agent Identification/Quantification, Vector Control Methods, Field Medical Refrigeration Equipment, Field Sterilization Equipment, Medical Grade Water, Field Guerney, Noninvasive Vital Sign Monitors, Controlled Release Pesticides, Microbial Fate, Organic Chemistry, Environmental Biology, Inorganic Chemistry, Field Oxygen Generation, Teleradiography, Foreign Medical Materiel,

Environmental Modelling, Inhalation Toxicology, Teratology, Aquatic Toxicology, Combat Medical Materiel, Environmental Fate, Chemical Protective Equipment, Field X-Ray Equipment, Hazardous/Toxic Waste Disposal, Pesticide Dispersal Equipment.”

“INTRODUCTION - The U.S. Army Biomedical Research and Development Laboratory (USABRDL) is a small, highly efficient subordinate unit of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), located at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The Laboratory performs research and development within all of the parent Command's research areas. The USABRDL is characterized by broad mission responsibilities met by diverse, a multidisciplinary team of scientists and engineers performing basic and applied research and development in all funding categories, 6.1 - 6.4. The mission includes development of medical materiel, protection of soldiers and civilian employees from occupational health threats and protection and enhancement of the environment. This past year has been marked by two significant changes for the Laboratory. On 25 November 1986, the name of the Laboratory was changed from the U.S. Army Medical Bioengineering Research and Development Laboratory (USAMBRDL) to the U.S. Army Biomedical Research and Development Laboratory.This more accurately reflects the diverse array of professional capabilities dedicated to our mission accomplishment. On 8 September 1987 the unit colors were passed as the command of the Laboratory changed hands. Trends and accomplishments are highlighted in Volume 1 of this report and all Research and Technology Work Unit Summaries (DD Form 1498s) are presented in Volume 2. Detailed in-house and contractor's research is synopsized in reports which are filed with the Defense Technical Information Center.

Questions or comments about this report are welcomed and may be addressed to the Commander, USABRDL.”

The 1989-90 report is about “Aquatic Toxicology, Aquatic Microcosm, Biochemical Toxicology, Carcinogenicity Research, Reproductive Effects Research, Toxin Decontamination, Biological Warfare. Vector Control, Toxicology, Occupational Health and Exposure Assessment, Health Effects Test Methodology, Alternative Test Methods, In Vitro Test Methods, Cell Cultures, Oncogene, Biomarkers, Environmental Hazards Assessment, Photochemistry, Environmental Quality, Pesticide Dispersal, Medical Imaging, Combat Medicine, Nerve Agents, Industrial Hygiene Sampling, Microbiology, Combustion Products, Liquid Gun Propellant, Organic Chemistry, Inorganic Chemistry, Radiographs, Field Medical Materiel, Field Sterilizers, Sterilization, Ecological Effects, Drinking Water Quality, Weapons Health and Performance Effects, Filmless Radiography, Water Quality Standards, Health Advisories, On-Site Biomonitoring, Disinfectants, Field Water Quality, IV Fluids, Demand Oxygen Controller, Special Operations Forces Medical Materiel, Surgical Scrub Sink, Cricothyroidotomy, Far-Forward Surgical Care, Multi-Frequency Jet Ventilation, Far-Forward X-Ray Film Developing, Mass Casualty Triage Lighting, Resuscitation/Ventilation, Decontaminable Litter, Chemical Defense Materiel, Vital signs Monitor, Wound Lavage, Life Detector, Drawover Anesthesia Device, Arthropod Repellents.”

The 1975 Report “ establishes a data base of physical, chemical, toxicological, and biological properties for: mustard gas; thiodiglycol; lewisite; lewisite oxide; methylphosphonic acid; isopropyl methylphosphonate; diisopropyl methyl-phosphonate; chlorate salts; wheat rust; inorganic arsenic compounds; mercury and its salts; dicyclopentadiene; aldrin; dieldrin; chlordane; and endrin, and provides a summary of pertinent information concerning: physical and chemical properties; analytical methods; mammalian toxicology; ecological considerations or wildlife, birds, fish, reptiles, amphibians, invertebrates, microorganisms, and plants; and existing standards.

Key words: Aldrin, Carcinogenesis, Dieldrin, Amphibians, Chlorate (C103-) salts, Diisopropyl methylphosphonate (DIMP), Analytical methods, Chlordane, Endrin, Arsenic compounds, Decomposition, Fish, Birds, Dicyclopentadiene (DCPD), Invertebrates, Isopropyl methylphosphonate (IMP), Physico-chemical properties, Lewisite, Plants, Lewisite oxide, Pollution, Mammals, Reptiles, Man, Standards, Mercury and mercury salts, Teratogenesis, Metabolism, Thiodiglycol, Methylphosphonic acid· (MPA), Toxicity, Microorganisms, Translocation, Miscellaneous biological effects, Transport, Mustard gas, Volatilization, mutagenesis, Wheat rust, Persistence, Wildlife.”

These Reports are Unclassified.

IV. The Reigle Report

Remember the lack of veracity demonstrated in this reading by the Government in this whole matter necessitating the hearings.

Sales of Pathogens to Iraq by the United States approved by Commerce:

“Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention,

Atlanta, GA, June 21, 1995.

Hon. Donald W. Riegle, Jr.,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Riegle: In 1993, at your request, the Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) forwarded to your

office a listing of all biological materials, including

viruses, retroviruses, bacteria, and fungi, which CDC

provided to the government of Iraq from October 1, 1984,

through October 13, 1993. Recently, in the course of

reviewing our shipping records for a Freedom of Information

Act (FOIA) request from a private citizen, we identified an

additional shipment, on May 21, 1985, that was not included

on the list that was provided to your office. Following this discovery, we conducted a thorough review of all of our shipping records and are confident that we have now included a listing of all shipments. A corrected list is enclosed (Note: the new information is italicized).

These additional materials were hand-carried by Dr.

Mohammad Mahoud to Iraq after he had spent three months

training in a CDC laboratory. Most of the materials were non-infectious diagnostic reagents for detecting evidence of infections to mosquito-borne viruses. Only two of the

materials are on the Commodity Control List, i.e., Yersinin

Pestis (the agent of plague) and dengue virus. (the strain of plague bacillus was non-virulent, and CDC is currently

petitioning the Department of Commerce to remove this

particular variant from the list of controlled materials).

We regret that our earlier list was incomplete and

appreciate your understanding.

Sincerely,

David Satcher,

Director.

Enclosure. (Copy unclear)

CDC Shipments to Iraq October 1, 1984 through Present

4/26/85--Minister of Health, Ministry of Health, Baghdad, Iraq:

8 Vials antigen and antisera, (R. rickettsii and R. typhi)

to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious).

5/21/85--Dr. Mahammad Imad, Al-Dean M. Mahmud, Dept. of Microbiology, College of Medicine, University of Basrah, Basrah, Iraq

Etiologic Agents:--lyophilized arbovirus seed;

West Nile Fever Virus, Lyophilized cultures of avirulant

yersinia pestis and Y. pseudotuberculosis ((strain r);

0.5 m1 Bhania Virus (Iq 690);

0.5 m1 Dongua Virus type 2 (New Guinea C);

0.5 m1 Dongua Virus type 3 (H-97);

0.5 m1 Hazara Virus (Pak IC 280);

0.5 m1 Kemeroud Virus (rio);0.5 m1 Langat Virus (TP 21);

0.5 m1 Sandfly Fever/Naples Virus (original);

0.5 m1 Sandfly Fever/Sicilian Virus (original);

0.5 m1 Sindbis Virus (Egar 339);

0.5 m1 Tahyna Virus (Bardos 92);

0.5 m1 Thgoto Virus (II A).

Diagnostic Reagents and Associated Materials:

2. vials each Y. pestis FA (+ & -) conjugates;

2 vials Y. pestis Fraction 1 antigen;

10 vials Y. pestis bacteriophage impregnated paper strips;

5 plague-infected mouse tissue smears (fixed);

Various protocols for diagnostic bacteriology tests;

23 X 0.5 m1 Bhanja (Ig 690) antigen;

22 X 0.5 m1 Dengue Type 2 (New Guinea C) antigen;

22 X 0.5 ml Dengue type 3 (H-69) antigen;

22 X 0.5 ml Hazara (Pak IC 290) antigen;

22 X 0.5 ml Kemarovo (Rio) antigen;

22 X 0.5 ml Langat (IF 21) antigen,

24 X 0.5 ml Sandfly Fever/Naples (original) antigen;

24 X 0.5 ml Sandfly Fever/Sicilian (original) antigen;

Diagnostic Reagents and Associated Materials:

2 vials each Y. pestis PA (+6-) conjugates;

2 vials Y. pestis Fraction 2 antigen;

10 vials Y. pestis bacteriophage impregnated paper stripe;

5 plague-infected mouse tissue smears (fixed);

Various protocols for diagnostic bacteriology tests;

23 X 0.5 ml Bhanja (Ig 690) antigen;

22 X 0.5 ml Dengue Type 2 (New Guinea C) antigen;

22 X 0.5 ml Dengue Type 3 (H-67) antigen;

22 X 0.5 ml Hazara (Pak IC 280) antigen;

23 X 0.5 ml Kemorovo (Rio) antigen;

21 X 0.5 ml Langat (TP 21) antigen;

24 X 0.5 ml Sandfly Fever/Maples (original) antigen;

24 X 0.5 ml Sandfly Fever/Sicilian (original) antigen;

23 X 0.5 ml Sindbis (EgAr 339) antigen;

23 X 0.5 ml Tahyna (Bardos 92) antigen;

20 X 0.5 ml Thogoto (II A) antigen;

23 X 0.5 ml Bhanja (Ig 690) antigen;

21 X 0.5 ml West Nile (Eg 101) antigen;

20 X 0.5 ml Normal SMB antigen;

10 X 0.5 ml Normal SML antigen;

5 X 1.0 ml Bhanja (Ig 690) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml Dengue Type 2 (New Guinea C) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml Dengue Type 3 (H-87) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml Hazara (Pak IC 280) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml Xemerovo (Rio) antibody;

5 X 2.0 ml Langat (TP 21) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml Sandfly Fever/Naples (original) antibody;

5 X 2.0 ml Sandfly Fever/Sicilian (original) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml Sindbis (EgAr 339) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml Tahyna (Bardos 92) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml Thogoto (II A) antibody;

5 X 1.0 ml West Nile (Eg 101) antibody;

3 X 1.0 ml Normal MHIAF (SMB) antibody;

3 X 1.0 ml Normal MHIAF (SML) antibody;

1.0 ml A polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml AIYA, etc. polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml B polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml BUN polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml BWA polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml C-1 polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml C-2 polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml CAL polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml CAP polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml CON polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml GMA polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml KEM polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml PAL polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml PAT polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml PHL polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml ORF polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml Rabies, etc. polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml STM polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml TCR polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml VSV polyvalent grouping fluid;

1.0 ml polyvalent 1;

1.0 ml polyvalent 2;

1.0 ml polyvalent 3;1.0 ml polyvalent 4;

1.0 ml polyvalent 5;

1.0 ml polyvalent 6;

1.0 ml polyvalent 7;

1.0 ml polyvalent 8;

1.0 ml polyvalent 9;

1.0 ml polyvalent 10;

1.0 ml polyvalent 12;

1.0 ml Group B1 reagent;

1.0 ml Bluetongue reagent;

4 X 0.5 ml Dengue 1-4 set monoclonal antibodies;

1.0 ml St. Louis Enc. (MSI-7) monoclonal antibody;

1.0 ml Western Eq. Enc. (McMillian) monoclonal antibody.

6/26/85--

Dr. Mohammed S. Khidar, University of Baghdad, College of

Medicine, Department of Microbiology, Baghdad, Iraq 3 yeast

cultures Candida sp. (etiologic).

3/10/86

Dr. Rowil Shawil Georgis, M.B.CH.B.D.F.H., Officers City

Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69, House 28/I,

Baghdad, Iraq. 1 vial Botulinum Toxiod # A-2 (non-

infectious).

4/21/56--Dr. Rowil Shawil Georgis, N.B. Cir. D.D.F.H., Officers City

Al-Muthana, Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69, House 23/r, Baghdad,

Iraq

1 vial Botulinum toxin (non-infections).

7/21/88--Dr. Faqid Alfarhood, Mahela 887, Zikak 54, House 97, Hay

Aljihad, Kerk, Baghdad, Iraq

teaching supplies (non-infectious); CDC procedures manuals.

7/27/88--Dr. Fagid Alfarhood, Mahela 887, Zikak 54, House 97, Hay

Aljihad, Kerk, Baghdad, Iraq

teaching supplies (non-infectious); CDC procedure manuals.

11/28/89--Dr. Nadeal T. Al Hadithi, University of Basrah, College of

Science, Department of Biology, Basrah, Iraq

5.0 mls Enterococcus faecalis;

5.0 mls Enterococcus faccium;

5.0 mls Enterococcus avium;

5.0 mls Enterococcus raffinosus;

5.0 mls Enterococcus gallinarum;

[[Page S8996]]

5.0 mls Enterococcus durans;

5.0 mls Enterococcus hirac;

5.0 mls Streptococcus bovis (cciologic).

From U.S. Senate Hearing Report 103-900

u.s. exports of biological materials to iraq

The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act. Pursuant to the Act, Committee staff contacted the U.S. Department of Commerce and requested information on the export of biological materials during the years prior to the Gulf War. After receiving this information, we contacted a principal supplier of these materials to determine what, if any, materials were exported to Iraq which might have contributed to an offensive or defensive biological warfare program. Records available from the supplier for the period from 1985 until the present show that during this time, pathogenic (meaning "disease producing"), toxigenic (meaning "poisonous"), and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S.

Department of Commerce. Records prior to 1985 were not available, according to the supplier. These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction. According to the Department of Defense's own Report to Congress on the Conduct of

the Persian Gulf War, released in April 1992:

"By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had developed

biological weapons. It's advanced and aggressive biological warfare program was the most advanced in the Arab world. The program probably began late in the 1970's and concentrated on the development of two agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax bacteria. . . . Large scale production of these agents began in 1989 at four facilities near

Baghdad. Delivery means for biological agents ranged from simple aerial bombs and artillery rockets to surface-to-surface missiles."

Included in the approved sales are the following biological materials (which have been considered by various nations for use in war), with their associated disease symptoms:

Bacillus Anthracis: anthrax is a disease-producing bacteria

identified by the Department of Defense in the The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, as being a major component in the Iraqi biological warfare program.

Anthrax is an often-fatal infectious disease due to ingestion of spores. It begins abruptly with high fever, difficulty in breathing, and chest pain. The disease eventually results in septicemia (blood poisoning), and the mortality is high. Once septicemia is advanced, antibiotic therapy may prove useless, probably because the exotoxins

remain, despite the death of the bacteria.

Clostridium Botulinum: a bacterial source of botulinum toxin, which causes vomiting, constipation, thirst, general weakness, headache, fever, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the pupils and paralysis of the muscles involving swallowing. It is often fatal.

Histoplasma Capsulatum: causes a disease superficially resembling tuberculosis that may cause pneumonia, enlargement of the liver and spleen, anemia, an influenza-like illness and an acute inflammatory skin disease marked by tender red modules, usually on the shins. Reactivated infection usually involves the lungs, the brain, spinal

membranes, heart, peritoneum, and the adrenals.

Brucella Melitensis: a bacterial which can cause chronic fatigue, loss of appetite, profuse sweating when at rest, pain in joints and muscles, insomnia, nausea, and damage to major organs.

Clostridium Perfringens: a highly toxic bacteria which causes gas gangrene. The bacteria produce toxins that move along muscle bundles in the body killing cells and producing necrotic tissue that is then favorable for further growth of the bacteria itself. Eventually, these

toxins and bacteria enter the bloodstream and cause systemic illness. In addition, several shipments of Escherichia Coli (E.Coli) and genetic materials, as well as human and bacterial DNA, were shipped directly to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.

The following is a detailed listing of biological materials, provided by the American Type Culture Collection, which were exported to agencies of the government of Iraq pursuant to the issuance of an

export licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department:

Date: February 8, 1985

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Agency

Materials Shipped: Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup.

Date: February 22, 1985

Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education

Materials Shipped: Histoplasma capsulanum var. farciminosum (ATCC

32136). Class III pathogen.

Date: July 11, 1985.

Sent to: Middle And Near East Regional A.

Materials Shipped: Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum

(ATCC 32136). Class III pathogen.

Date: May 2, 1986.

Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education.

Materials Shipped: 1. Bacillus Anthracis Cohn (ATCC 10).

Batch #08-20-82 (2 each). Class III pathogen.

2. Bacillus Subtitlis (Ehrenberg) Cohn (ATCC 82). Batch

#06-20-84 (2 each).

3. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 3502). Batch #07-07-

81 (3 each). Class III Pathogen.

4. Clostridium perfringens (Weillon and Zuber) Hauduroy, et

al (ATCC 3624). Batch #10-85SV (2 each).

5. Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 6051). Batch #12-06-84 (2 each).

6. Francisella tularensis, var. tularensis Olsufiev (ATCC

6223) Batch #05-14-79 (2 each). Avirulent, suitable forpreparations of diagnostic antigens.

7. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 9441). Batch #03-84 (3 each).

Highly toxigenic.

8. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 9564). Batch #03-02-

79 (2 each). Class III pathogen.

9. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 10779). Batch #04-24-84S (3

each).

10. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 12916). Batch #08-14-80

(2 each). Agglutinating type 2.

11. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 13124). Batch #07-84SV (3

each). Type A, alpha-toxigenic, produces lechitinase C.J.

Appl.

12. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14185). Batch #01-14-80 (3

each). G.G. Wright (Fort Dertick) V770-NP1-R. Bovine anthrax,

Class III pathogen.

13. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14578). Batch #01-06-78 (2

each). Class III pathogen.

14. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14581). Batch #04-18-85 (2

each).

15. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14945). Batch #06-21-81 (2

each).

16. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 17855. Batch #06-21-

71. Class III pathogen.

17. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 19213). Batch #3-84 (2 each).

18. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 19397). Batch #08-

18-81 (2 each). Class III pathogen.

19. Brucella abortus Biotype 3 (ATCC 23450). Batch #08-02-

84 (3 each). Class III pathogen.

20. Brucella abortus Biotype 9 (ATCC 23455). Batch #02-05-

68 (3 each). Class III pathogen.

21. Brucella melitensis Biotype 1 (ATCC 23456). Batch #03-

08-78 (2 each). Class III pathogen.

22. Brucella melitensis Biotype 3 (ATCC 23458. Batch #01-

29-68 (2 each). Class III pathogen.

23. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 25763. Batch #8-83

(2 each). Class III pathogen.

24. Clostridium botulinum Type F (ATCC 35415). Batch #02-

02-84 (2 each). Class III pathogen.

Date: August 31, 1987.

Sent to: State Company for Drug Industries.

Materials Shipped:

1. Saccharomyces cerevesia (ATCC 2601). Batch #08-28-08 (1

each).

2. Salmonella choleraesuis subsp. choleraesuis Serotype

typhia (ATCC 6539). Batch #06-86S (1 each).

3. Bacillus subtillus (ATCC 6633). Batch# 10-85 (2 each).

4. Klebsiella pneumoniae subsp. pneumoniae (ATCC 10031).

Batch# 08-13-80 (1 each).

5. Escherichia coli (ATCC 10536). Batch# 04-09-80 (1 each).

6. Bacillus cereus (11778). Batch# 05-85SV (2 each).

7. Staphylococcus epidermidis (ATCC 12228). Batch# 11-86s

(1 each).

8. Bacillus pumilus (ATCC 14884). Batch# 09-08-90 (2 each).

Date: July 11, 1988.

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.

Materials Shipped:

1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 11303). Batch# 04-87S. Phage

host.

2. Cauliflower Mosaic Caulimovirus (ATCC 45031). Batch# 06-

14-85. Plant virus.

3. Plasmid in Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (ATCC 37349). (Ti

plasmid for co-cultivation with plant integration vectors in

E Coli). Batch# 05-28-85.

Date: April 26, 1988.

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.

Materials Shipped:

Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine

phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1

(ATCC 57236) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli.

2. Hulambdal 14-8, clone: human hypoxanthine

phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1

(ATCC 57240) Phage vector; Suggest host: E.coli.

[[Page S8997]]

3. Hulambda 15, clone: human hypoxanthine

phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1

(ATCC 57242) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli.Date: August 31, 1987.

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.

Materials Shipped:

1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 23846). Batch# 07-29-83 (1 each).

2. Escherichia coli (ATCC 33694). Batch# 05-87 (1 each).

Date: September 29, 1988.

Sent to: Ministry of Trade.

Materials Shipped:

1. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 240). Batch# 05-14-63 (3 each).

Class III pathogen.

2. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 938). Batch# 1963 (3 each).

Class III pathogen.

3. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 3629). Batch# 10-23-85 (3

each).

4. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 8009). Batch# 03-30-84 (3

each).

5. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 8705). Batch# 06-27-62 (3

each). Class III pathogen.

6. Brucella abortus (ATCC 9014). Batch# 05-11-66 (3 each).

Class III pathogen.

7. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 10388). Batch# 06-01-73 (3

each).

8. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 11966). Batch# 05-05-70 (3

each). Class III pathogen.

9. Clostridium botulinum Type A. Batch# 07-86 (3 each).

Class III pathogen.

10. Bacillus cereus (ATCC 33018). Batch# 04-83 (3 each).

11. Bacillus ceres (ATCC 33019). Batch# 03-88 (3 each).

Date: January 31, 1989.

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.

Materials Shipped:

1. PHPT31, clone: human hypoxanthine

phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1

(ATCC 57057)

2. plambda500, clone: human hypoxanthine

phosphoribosyltransferase pseudogene(HPRT). Chromosome(s):

5

p14-p13 (ATCC 57212).

Date: January 17, 1989

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.

Materials Shipped:

1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine

phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1

(ATCC 57237) Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.

2. Hulambda14, clone: human hypoxanthine

phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1

(ATCC 57240) Cloned from human lymphoblast. Phage vector;

Suggested host: E. coli.

3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine

phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1

(ATCC 57241) Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.

Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has compiled

a listing of biological materials shipped to Iraq prior to

the Gulf War. The listing covers the period from October 1,

1984 (when the CDC began keeping records) through October 13,

1993. The following materials with biological warfare

significance were shipped to Iraq during this period:

Date: November 28, 1989.

Sent to: University of Basrah, College of Science,

Department of Biology.

Materials Shipped:

1. Enterococcus faecalis.

2. Enterococcus faecium.

3. Enterococcus avium.

4. Enterococcus raffinosus.

5. Enterococcus gallinarium.

6. Enterococcus durans.

7. Enterococcus hirae.

8. Streptococcus bovis (etiologic).

Date: April 21, 1986.

Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street

13, Close 69 House 28/I, Baghdad, Iraq.

Materials Shipped:

1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid (non-infectious).

Date: March 10, 1986.

Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street

13, Close 69 House 28/I, Baghdad, Iraq.

Materials Shipped:

1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid #A2 (non-infectious).Date: June 25, 1985.

Sent to: University of Baghdad, College of Medicine,

Department of Microbiology.

Materials Shipped:

1. 3 yeast cultures (etiologic) Candida sp.

Date: May 21, 1985.

Sent to: Basrah, Iraq.

Materials Shipped:

1. Lyophilized arbovirus seed (etiologic).

2. West Nile Fever Virus.

Date: April 26, 1985.

Sent to: Minister of Health, Ministry of Health, Baghdad,

Iraq.

Materials Shipped:

1.8 vials antigen and antisera (r. rickettsii and r. typhi) to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious).”